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Abstract. Although migration and religion have traditionally developed as two separate 
research topics, in the current context of globalization and trans-nationalism attention begins to 
focus on the way they interconnect. Religion received little attention in Romanian studies on 
migration undertaken so far. Using the results of our survey among Romanian international 
migrants of different religious faiths, this paper aims to raise interest in migration-religion 
relationship and, at the same time, to improve the understanding of the economic performance 
factors in a migration context by focusing on the distinctive characteristics of Romanian 
religious minorities. We address both the theoretical and the empirical dimension of this topic, 
making use of various statistical methods. Our main findings are consistent with the assumption 
that religious belief is reflecting upon the behavior and economic performance of Romanian 
migrants. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The renewed interest in religion worldwide brought about increased attention to the role 
of religious affiliations in migration phenomenon and in the integration of the immigrants in the 
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receiving countries. The world had entered a post-secular era in which, far for determining the 
abandonment of religious beliefs, modernization has produced a religious plurality which needs 
to be acknowledged and studied
1
. The multi-sided relationship that exists between migration and 
religion opens up a wide range of research lines, such as the interconnections between the 
dominant and the migrant minorities religions, the degree of tolerance for the immigrants 
traditions and religious practices, the establishment of places of worship for the migrant 
minorities; the influence of immigrants on the religious diversity in the host country and the 
possible challenges to mainstream denominations; the changes of the immigrants‟ religion during 
their integration in the host society; the contribution of the religion to spiritual comfort and 
identity preservation for the immigrants.  
In many of the classic studies on immigrants‟ integration in the host society, researchers 
have emphasized that religion has a key role to play
2
, as an important part of the cultural 
baggage. As migration flows are continuously growing in this increasingly globalised world, the 
traditionally stable local religious systems are beginning to be challenged by the immigrants that 
bring on their own traditions and religious beliefs and practices. The receiving communities may 
respond to this intercultural pressure by reaffirming their own identity and traditions as opposed 
to the migrants, which is sometimes leading to clashes
3
 and calls for state intervention and 
adjustments on both sides
4
. Societies become increasingly aware of the existence of a religious 
problem in the integration process and, especially after the events of 11
th
 September the religious 
question has become an issue of high interest in migration politics.   
In order and to understand and prevent such problems, research has developed in this 
field, aiming to identify and explain the large variety of ways in which religion is involved in the 
migration movements and in the immigrants‟ successful resettlement in the context of a different 
dominant religion country. As economic performance of the immigrants is an essential part of 
their successful integration, the relationship between religion and economics is another key topic 
of research. 
Given the fact that an increasing share of Romanian immigrants represents religious 
minorities in destination country, understanding the migration-religion relationship and assessing 
how religious affiliation may alter the economic situation of migrants represent issues of interest 
for Romania as well. Emigrants left Romania in a number of emigration waves. The first major 
one, dating back to the early 90
th
, had a strong ethnical motivation. It redesigned the Romanian 
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religious mix, as ethnic minorities usually are religious minorities as well. Although the work 
motivation now dominates the emigration flows, the Romanian immigrant communities, 
frequently established on religious grounds, are acting as an attraction factor for the potential 
emigrants of the same faith. While earlier studies on Romanian emigration mostly neglected the 
religious issue, some recent ones acknowledge that religious affiliation has a role to play in 
providing stability, reassurance, a more rapid integration and economic success for the 
immigrants.  
In this context we address two interrelated research questions: are there any differences in 
behavior, including the propensity to remit, among Romanian immigrants of different religions? 
and can religion be one of the explaining factors of Romanian migrants‟ economic performance? 
This undertaking is based on the data provided by our online survey conducted during 
August-December 2010 among Romanian emigrants of different religions. We employed 
statistical methods to identify the similarities and to highlight the differences among dominant 
and minority religions in Romania. Our work is providing insightful addition to the traditional 
analysis of migration and remittances by including religion, in a regression framework, as one of 
explaining factors that allow for understanding the economic success of Romanian international 
migrants. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers an extended review of the 
relevant theories on the interaction between migration and religion, and on religious affiliation, 
in connection with economic outcomes. Section 3 explains the basic hypothesis and the 
theoretical background of our paper, including a detailed description of religious demography in 
Romania. Section 4 introduces the data set and variables involved in our approach and discuss 
the appropriate econometric methodology as well. Section 5 concentrates on the empirical 
results. Finally, concluding remarks and directions for future research complete the paper. 
 
2. Religion’s impact on immigrant integration and economic performance 
 
The growing literature on migration of the last decades emphasizes its complex social, cultural 
and economic impact, both in the sending and recipient countries. The research on migration has 
contributed to the definition of new theories and concepts such as globalization, 
transnationalism, post-colonialism, Diasporas, and cosmopolitanism. It has also fueled increasing 
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public debate on key issues connected with immigration such as national identity, minority 
rights, security, social integration, cultural diversity and, more recently, religion
5
.  The research 
that developed in this field identified and explained a large variety of ways in which religion is 
involved in the immigrants‟ successful integration. We further present the main avenues of 
research. 
 
2.1. Religion’s role in the life of the immigrants  
 
 Religious practice in immigrant communities.  Religious identity and practice becomes 
more important for the immigrants, than they did before in the homeland and the religious 
institutions forged in the new communities become focal points in their new life abroad
6
.  Many 
studies have emphasized the religiosity boost in a migration context, as immigrants need religion 
to help them preserve spiritual identity and cohesion in a group
7
. The religious bond acts as one 
of the strongest social ties.The same effect was noticed for Romanian migrants as well
8
.   
While some immigrants continue to identify primarily with their homeland, the exposure 
to a new culture and the sense of uprooting make others experience major transformations in 
their religious and cultural identity
9
.  On the other hand, immigrants gain a new perception of 
own religious affiliation, against other faiths. Migration can thus, in a long time perspective, 
implement and redesign the religious traditions, and even bring about independent traditions with 
distinct characteristics, in contrast to former home tradition
10
.  
Religion is helping alleviate the difficulties faced by the immigrants in a new 
unpredictable environment by offering them the three Rs: Refuge, Respectability and 
Resources
11
. Refuge, as religious practice in the immigrant communities creates strong bonds 
and provides a sense of belonging and security for migrants. Respectability, as during the 
struggle to build a new life in the host country, religion supplies spiritual identity, self-awareness 
and ethical values. Resources can be supplied through social networks created around religious 
communities that provide help in finding employment, offer information about social services or 
create a place for social interactions. 
The establishment of immigrants own religious institutions. Religious resettlement in a 
new context frequently includes the establishment of religious institutions among immigrants, in 
direct proportion to the development of the immigrant population itself
12
. Of special importance 
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are the socio-religious associations, aiming to raise funds and organize activities
13
. Another 
prominent role of such organizations involves fighting for legal rights regarding specific 
religious or cultural practices, non discrimination, and equal access to public resources
14
. 
Religious associations have a mixed influence on the successful integration of immigrants: they 
are useful as providers of security and mutual support, but if these communities are marginalized 
by the host society (e.g. ghetto like status) the integration process can be jeopardized
15
. The new 
immigrant religious institutions should promote dialogue with similar religious communities of 
the host society creating a bridging tool for integration, avoiding marginalization and frustration 
that generate conflicts
16
.   
Religious changes in subsequent generations. The so-called second and third 
generations of immigrants are born and raised in different settings than their parents
17
. They are 
educated in Western schools, influenced by secular and civil society practices and assimilate 
local cultures, while still maintaining their original ones. All that may determine major 
alterations or even abandonment of traditional religious practices in their community. Youth 
natural dissatisfaction with conservative community leaders and religious teachers and the 
conflict between generations may aggravate this process.     
The role of religious institutions in the sending and receiving countries. Churches in 
the sending and receiving countries both have various roles to play in the migration process, 
acting as a bridge between different cultures and communities, offering support and solidarity 
programmes to help individuals, promoting a migration policy which respects human rights and 
non-discrimination
18
, warning and protecting against the human trafficking associated to the 
migration flows
19
. Acting as responsible parts of the organized civil society, the churches in the 
receiving countries should protect the human dignity, rights and religious freedom of the 
migrants and refugees. Many churches in Western countries promote support for migrants, such 
as programmes on housing, education, counseling for migrants and refugees, language schools 
and courses for vocational training, legal assistance and enabling access to the labour 
market
20
. Religious associations are often involved in the process of migration itself, alongside 
cultural and work-related interest groups.  
Government policy and the attitude of the receptor society towards immigrants’ 
religion. The estimated 95 million migrants that go all over the world in search of a better life, 
carrying  their religion and traditions with them, create potential conflicts with the way of life in 
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the destination countries. As states handle the relationship with religion in different ways, 
the migrants coming from authoritarian religious countries may experience difficulties in 
the integration process in religious pluralistic countries, and governments are faced with the 
challenge to manage increasingly heterogeneous societies. Except for Buddhism, all religions 
exhibit a certain degree of intolerance, with Hinduism and Islam the less tolerant, and 
Catholicism and Protestantism at about the same level
21
. Nevertheless, some Christian-secular 
countries having large Islamic immigrant communities, such as Germany demonstrate that 
religious differences and successful integration are not contradictory
22
. Germany is a success 
story proving that problems may be prevented if migrants are provided adequate support in their 
integration efforts, and that the religious identity of minorities can be preserved by a strategy of 
cross-cultural education empowerment
23
. Sometimes a religious assimilation does take place, 
such as the inclusion of the Protestant Huguenots, the 17th and 18th century as refugees to 
England, or in the liberal Netherlands. The desire for social integration and social acceptance 
may lead immigrants to religious conversion, mainly in subsequent generations.   
The relationship with the homeland. As immigrants establish new relations into 
receiving societies, they also remain linked to sending community. Consequently, migration 
impacts not only the lives of the migrants themselves, but also the lives of the communities in 
places of origin. The existence of strong links of the immigrants with the homeland was long 
documented through the history of migration
24
. Although such connections are expected to fade 
in time in space, modern instant communication and fast travel create new forms of transnational 
links
25
, proved to be very resilient.  
From an economic point of view, the strongest impact on sending countries is conveyed 
through remittances. Migration and remittances do undoubtedly relieve pressure on the sending 
countries, compensating for underemployment and generating new opportunities
26
, helping 
alleviate poverty and improving life in poor countries
27
. Such effects of migrant remittances are 
particularly important for Romania as, according to the World Bank data, it is on the 5
th
 place in 
the European top of emigration countries
28
 and on the 4th place as remittance recipient country
29
 
($4.5 bn of remittances in 2010, representing 4.4 percent of GDP in 2009). According to some 
experts, without remittances the current account deficits in Romania would have been over 50% 
higher. 
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Besides the economic effect of remittances, emigrants may also affect the development of 
religion in the homeland: the wealth, education and exposure to foreign influences transferred 
from Diaspora may have significant effects on organization, practice and even belief in the origin 
countries
30
.  
Economic activity and religious rules. Economic inclusion is a key element in a 
successful integration, with religious affiliation as a relevant factor of influence (as it will be 
discussed in the next section). While the new environment opens up new carrier approaches and 
business development opportunities for the migrants, religious laws on work may also have a 
say. In some religions there are laws that influence the working conditions, the duration of the 
workday and free time or impose clothing and food rules that prohibit believers to work in 
certain places
31
. Commerce and industry may also be influenced by specific consumer behaviors 
on religious grounds. Other sensitive questions regard the existence of different rules concerning 
women‟ work and the problem of equal rights for men and women at the workplace.   
 
2.2. Causal links between religious belief and economic performance.  
 
Religion underpins the general set of beliefs of a society, shaping its values, customs and 
traditions which in turn define the behavioral patterns of individuals, including their economic 
behavior. Consequently, religion based differences among countries and individuals may act as a 
major determinant of economic performance. In this respect, many scholars have argued that a 
country‟s ability in growing and competing internationally relies not only on economic, social, 
historic and environmental factors, but on cultural ones as well, with religion as a key 
component. 
Religion reflects upon the economic life in a society through various channels such as the 
shared values and beliefs which further determine the efficiency of the decision-making process 
and thus economic outcomes; by impacting the attitude towards change and innovation, which is 
crucial to progress and to economic growth; by setting the social and economic objectives in 
accordance to the underlying values and religious beliefs of the society; by defining work ethics 
and moral equity, such as the obligation to provide for future generation. 
Religion may have both positive and negative impact on the economic outcomes. On the 
positive side, religion can boost economic development by promoting a correct attitude toward 
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work, honesty, and accumulation. At the same time, religion may encourage thrift, which would 
stimulate savings, investments and therefore economic growth. It can discourage criminal 
activities and diminish corruption, and may also improve trust, all bringing favorable effects on 
economic life. A tolerant religion welcomes foreigners, which may in turn trigger economic 
growth through foreign investments and immigrant work. By forbidding alcohol, drugs, 
gambling, etc and encouraging family life, religion favors a better health that contributes to 
higher labour productivity.  On the negative side, there are religion based limitations on the 
pursue of profit, credit markets and capital accumulation, and some countries are redirecting 
substantial resources from the market economy towards religious goals (e.g. impressive 
constructions).    
Weber‟s seminal work, The Protestant Ethic and the ‘‘Spirit’’ of Capitalism32, in1905, 
was the first to acknowledge the importance of religion in understanding the economic success. 
He argued that the Protestant Reformation has brought about a mental revolution that made 
possible the rise of modern capitalism
33
. The Calvinist doctrine praising individual 
responsibility, labor as a moral duty, efficient activity, thrift, approved risk-taking, was seen as 
crucial for setting the right attitude towards economic activity, entrepreneurship and wealth 
accumulation in a capitalist context. Weber‟s critics did not reject religion‟s influence on 
economics, but rather contested his exclusive Protestant line of thought
34
. Critics stressed that 
Weber only captured the Protestants‟ view, omitting Catholics‟ essential contribution to the 
development of science
35
 and their bigger wealth that stands as prove for economic success and 
material accumulation
36
. In the same line, Greif
37
, and soon after Lal
38
 pointed to various ways in 
which Catholics prompted economic and social innovations in Europe. For instance, Pope 
Gregory I favored changes in family law, while Pope Gregory VII supported modern legal 
institutions.  
In the 60
th
 there was a second wave of studies on the economics of religion, including 
scholars who build on the role of religious affiliation as base for practices and institutions
39
 that 
reflect upon economic performance. In the same line with Weber, but more moderate, 
Eisenstadt
40
 assessed an indirect, weaker role of Protestant religion in economic outcomes, 
stating that religion accounts for changes in the values and behaviors that redefine the political 
and social institutions, which in turn exert a „„transformative potential‟‟ of the economy.  
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To sum up, researchers generally agree on the positive economic impact of all Christian 
religion. In opposition, Islamic countries‟ slow economic development for most of millennium is 
considered to be largely determined by its system of religious beliefs. Among the world‟s major 
religions, Islam seems to be the most economic underperforming, many scholars explaining the 
relative poverty of the Muslims (both at national and individual level
41
) through the existence  of 
uniquely Islamic economic practices or institutions unfavorable to growth,  such as the 
prohibition on the  charging of interest, or the obligation to pay alms
42
. Moreover, Islam preaches 
fatalism which is opposite to entrepreneurship and growth
43
. For instance, the Islamic practices 
in force have long inhibited the commerce, until the introduction of new Western-inspired 
institutions in the Muslim world in the 19th century
44
. Through its care for social security, wealth 
taxation and immoral tax, Islam is more concerned with the redistribution of income, rather than 
mere economic growth. 
Many studies that illustrate religion‟s connections to economic performance build on the 
role of institutions in intermediating values and influencing economic outcomes
45
, on the 
grounds that the existence of a dominant religion or the existence of a state-supported religion is 
economically relevant
46
. A large part of these empirical studies are based on the World Values 
Survey data, but their results are mixed.  Making use of such data, Guiso et al
47
 highlighted 
religion based differences in the attitude toward private ownership, with Protestants, Catholics, 
and Hindus being more favorable, as compared to Muslims. They also found that Protestants and 
Hindus would accept a greater income inequality in exchange for growth, while Jews and 
Muslims will not.  In opposition to Christian religion, that favors the development of market 
economy and efficient institutions, Islamic religious beliefs were found not conducive to growth. 
Noland‟s findings48 are questioning the robustness of such results on the basis that in the 
contemporary world the convergence in institutions and practices has mainly invalidated that 
influence.   
Although supporting the existence of a religion – economy link, many empirical studies 
offer contradictory results when it comes to pointing to the religions that are conducive to 
growth. In a cross-country regression, Sala-i-Martin et al.
49
 found Islam to be 
positively associated with income growth, while Barro et al.
50
, using similar methodology, but a 
smaller panel of countries, showed that Catholicism is positively correlated to economic growth, 
while Hinduism, Islam, Orthodox Christianity, and Protestantism are not. Grier‟s study of former 
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British, French, and Spanish colonies indicated Protestantism as positively impacting growth and 
development
51
.  
Barro and McCleary
52
 found religious beliefs to be positively correlated with economic 
growth, while church attendance seems to be negatively correlated. Stulz and Williamson
53
 also 
documented the influence of cultural values, including dominant religion as a key factor, on debt 
market and banking development. In line with Weber, they found creditor rights and 
enforcement to be more important in the Protestant countries. 
 From a methodological perspective, these empirical studies on religion economics fit into 
two large categories: cross-country regressions and separate analysis of individual countries, 
each line of research having both advantages and limitations. The cross-country regressions main 
problem is the existence of institutional differences among countries. This makes unclear 
whether the effect identified is solely caused by the dominant religion or by other factors linked 
to religious beliefs. At the micro level, separate analysis of individual countries rise problems 
with endogeneity (the correlations they identify may not be causal) and do not allow for 
generalization of results.  
Researchers found that religion is a significant factor in explaining the economic success 
not only for countries, but for individuals as well. At an individual level, belonging to certain 
religions potentially entails economic advantages based on the reputational signal it provides for 
potential employers and customers, e.g. by inspiring trust (and consequently, diminished 
economic risk).  Empirical studies confirmed that the economic behavior of individuals and their 
economic performance do correlate with religion: for instance, in the United States Jews have 
bigger incomes then Christians
54
. 
Although religions are widely varying in practice, researchers generally agree on the 
existence of a causal link between religion and economic performance, both at individual and 
society level. Our paper aims at testing this hypothesis for the Romanian migrants belonging to 
different minority religions, as well as for the adherents of dominant Orthodox religion and for 
the non-religion group. There are only a few empirical studies that combine migration, religion 
and economic performance and, to the best of our knowledge, such a research has not been 
undertaken so far in Romania.  
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3. Romanian religious context and research hypothesis 
 
3.1. The Religious Demography in Romania.  
 
Romania is one of the most religious countries in Europe, according to recent evidence
55
. The 
World Values Survey 2005 also indicates high values of religiosity in Romania, situating it 
among the first European countries, alongside predominantly Catholic countries: Malta, Poland 
and Ireland. 
According to 2002 census
56
 the Orthodox believers (including the Orthodox Serb 
Bishopric of Timisoara) are dominant in Romania, including as much as 86.7% of the country's 
population. The Christian faith existed on this territory since the formation of Romanian people, 
as archaeology and linguistics prove
57
. Throughout their history, the Orthodox faith represented 
for Romanians an essential part of their national identity, as they had to resist foreign powers as 
the Ottoman Turks in Moldavia and Wallachia and the Hungarian rule in Transylvania. A 
religious revival took place after 1989 and the Romanian Orthodox Church became a constant 
advocate for religious solutions to various civil issues
58
. 
Another Orthodox Church in Romania is the Lipovan Old Rite Christian Church (0.1 % 
of the population), including Russians who came in Tulcea and Braila counties in the first half of 
the 18th century due to persecution unleashed by the Russian Orthodox Church.  
 The Roman Catholicism accounts for 4.7% of the population, mainly of Hungarian 
ethnicity, even though there are also more than 300,000 ethnic Romanian Catholics in 
Transylvania. Catholicism was first introduced in our country in the 11th century, due to 
missionaries (Benedictine monks).  
In 1698 a minority of Romanians in Transylvania became members of the Greek-rite 
Roman Catholics, thus obtaining equality of rights with Roman Catholics. They  now represent 
less than 1 percent of the population, located mainly in the northern part of Transylvania, and in 
Bucharest, Banat and Crisana as well. There are still unsolved problems concerning the 
restitution of Greek Catholic properties transferred to the Romanian Orthodox Church in 1948, 
during the communist regime.  
The Protestant and Neo Protestant adherents account for 5.2% of the total Romanian 
population. The majority belongs to the Protestant Reformed Church- Calvinist (3.2%) and is 
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located in Transylvania. Other Protestant Churches are: Unitarian Church of Romania (0.3%), 
Evangelical Church of Augustan Confession (0.2%)- German ethnicity and Evangelical Lutheran 
Church (0.1%) - Hungarian ethnicity. The smaller group of Neo Protestants include the 
Apostolic Church of God - Pentecostal Church (1.5%), Baptist Church (0.6%), and Seventh-day 
Adventist Church (0.4%).  
The Romanian Evangelical Church is an evangelical Christian movement, born in 
1920-1924 in Bucharest, that has no counterpart abroad. In 1939, they had to merge with 
Christian Evangelical Church (which came in Romania in the early 20th century). After 
December 1989, the two denominations functioned independently.  
Jehovah's Witnesses include 0.2% of the population based on 2002 census. 
Other smaller religious groups are also present in the country. Armenian Apostolic 
Church accounts to 0.1% of the population. Armenians settled in Transylvania since the 11th 
century where they found an atmosphere conducive to practice their traditional occupations in 
terms of religious tolerance. For about 700 years, Romania also has a small Muslim minority 
(0.3%), mostly of Tatar and Turkish ethnicity, concentrated in Constanta and Tulcea counties. 
There are also approximately 6,000 Jews (mostly in Bucharest) and 23,105 people of no religion 
or atheist. 
According to the US Department of State report on religious freedom 2010
59
, in Romania 
the government generally respected religious freedom in practice and minority religious groups 
had less complains than previously. 
 
3.2 Research hypothesis 
 
Religious affiliation is more and more viewed as an inherent, socially described characteristic 
similar to race or ethnicity. Because of this, religion has become an important variable of 
concern in studying labor discrimination
60
. Researchers have begun to examine how religious 
minority groups, in particular, experience an economic penalty or an economic advantage. It 
should be noted from the beginning that in this paper we do not separate in our econometric 
approach religious affiliation from religious participation, due to the lack of appropriate data.  
Most of the studies consider emigrants as a minority observed from the perspective of the 
receiving countries. There are empirical studies that demonstrate an economic penalty for 
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immigrants belonging to religious minorities in destination country. For instance, using data 
from Britain, Lindley
61
 finds an Islamic penalty for employment and earnings controlling for 
migration status and race. This indicates the effect of religious affiliation is more similar than 
diverse across differing societies, and through its comparative methodology, brings forward the 
hypothesis that religious minority immigrants are generally economically disadvantaged in the 
West. 
In this paper we adopt a different perspective by analyzing Romanian emigrants‟ religious 
affiliation, separate from their religious minority or majority status in the receiving country 
(depending on the dominant religion existing in the destination country). We consider the 
Romanian emigrants from a large number of countries, observed through an on line survey 
conducted in August-December 2010. 
Our main hypothesis is that religious affiliation has a significant influence on economic 
performance of Romanian emigrants. We expect to find that migrants affiliated with a minority 
religious group (Neo-Protestants, Protestants or Catholic) have different economic outcomes 
compared to Orthodox immigrants, which is the religious majority in Romania. Considering that 
religion provides a motivation for helping others and immigrants remit for altruistic motives, we 
therefore hypothesize that immigrants who are religiously affiliated are more likely to remit. 
 
4. Data, methods and variables  
 
4.1.Data  and methods 
 
To compensate for the lack of official statistical data on the religious beliefs of Romanian 
migrants, an online survey was conducted during August-December 2010 and our present work 
builds on the resulting database.  Respondents were asked questions on a variety of topics 
including income, employment, graduated studies both in Romania and in emigration country, 
length of migration, remittances and intention to return to Romania. Therefore, our survey 
represents a recent source of data on immigrant cohort and contains all necessary economic 
outcomes (i.e. employment, occupation, earnings and education) as well as necessary 
independent variables (i.e. religious affiliation) to test the influence of religious affiliation on 
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migrants‟ economic performance. The final database consisted of 1514 respondents from more 
than 20 countries and is referred henceforth as Romanian Emigrants‟ Study (RES). 
Separate multivariate models are estimated for income, income change and for the 
probability of remitting. Each multivariate regression equation includes religious affiliation and 
control variables. Linear regression was applied in the case of the first two outcome variables, 
income and income change. We employ a binary logistic regression model in order to identify 
the impact of religious affiliation factors on the probability of sending money to Romania. In our 
study, the binary dependent variable in regression model is whether a person is sending money to 
the home country or not (specifically 1 denotes that the individual is remitting and 0 otherwise).  
By employing these methods, we are following the main methodological trends in recent 
literature. For instance, Sacerdote and Gleaser
62
 apply regression analysis on religious beliefs 
and education, while Connor
63
 applies logistic regression on income and employability of 
emigrants living in US. 
  
 4.2. Variables involved in econometric analysis 
 
Effect variables. Three variables are used to assess labor market insertion: present 
income (INCOME), the dynamic of present income compared to income at the first job in 
destination countries (INDEX) and the attitude towards remitting money to home country 
(REM). They are the dependent variables in our regression models. 
Present income is the net monthly income at the moment of filling the questionnaire and 
is expressed in USD for comparability reasons. It is measured as a scale variable ranging from 
less than 500 USD to more than 5000 USD, with interval length of 500. Romanian emigration 
for labor is rather young and this fact is reflected by the great proportion of emigrants (90%) that 
emigrated less than 15 years ago. In this sense most of the Romanian emigrants are employed 
and they have an income. For this reason, we prefer to consider income level as the most 
appropriate outcome in our study, compared to other variables presented in the literature, such is 
employment
64
. 
Religious affiliation has an impact not only on the present life of emigrants, but also on 
the whole course of his/her emigration experience. Therefore, we evaluate economic outcome of 
emigrant through the index of income, computed by dividing the present migrant‟s income to the 
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income received in the first job in host country. Values higher than 1 for this index show an 
increase in income since the arrival in the host country (positive outcome), while values lower 
than 1 reflect a decrease in income (negative outcome).  
Another economic result of migration is the remitter quality of migrants. This is 
measured as a binary variable: 1 if the migrant is sending money to Romania and 0 otherwise. 
Money sent by emigrants to their families is increasing their quality of life and has positive 
effects on the family relations. Remittances are also an important source of external funding for 
developing countries. They rank only behind foreign direct investment and are much higher in 
magnitude than total official development assistance and private non-FDI flows. Therefore, it 
can be identified an increasing interest in the literature in studying such aspects and we consider 
remittances as being one of the positive outcomes of the economic activity of emigrants.  
 
  Variables of interest. The variable of interest in our research is religious affiliation, 
measured through a nominal variable. Religious affiliation initially considered in our research 
groupings were coded according to National Statistical Institute classification
65
 and included 
Romanian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Calvin, Lutheran, Pentecostal, Baptist, Adventist, Greek 
Catholic-Uniate,  Jewish, Islam, Atheist and No religion. These religions were further aggregated 
into the next seven categories (see Table 1): Romanian Orthodox, Catholic (Roman Catholic, 
Greek Catholic-Uniate), Protestant (Calvin, Lutheran), Neo-Protestant (Pentecostal, Baptist, 
Adventist and others), Jewish, Islam, and No religion (individuals that are atheist or without 
religion). 
We treat the variable of interest as dummies, considering as the reference group the 
emigrants with no religious affiliation. All the results from regression model have to be 
considered relative to this reference group. In this sense, the analysis will reveal the economic 
advantages or disadvantages of belonging to a religious community. 
Individuals who generally report “no religion” constitute a relatively heterogeneous 
group: it includes atheists, agnostics, and persons who were raised without an affiliation due to 
other circumstances (such is being a child from an inter-faith marriage). For this reason, many 
studies on religions have omitted this group; therefore, its addition in our study is a valuable 
contribution to better understanding the effects of religious affiliation on economic and 
demographic outcomes. 
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The “no religion” group is an important reference because there is a view in the 
literature
66
 that religious people have characteristics that are often difficult to measure directly, 
but which make for better economic outcomes. On the other hand, in their study
67
, David 
Blackaby et al. find that non religious persons are significantly advantaged against other 
religions, while the overall message is that religion is equally as important as ethnicity in helping 
to explain employment rates in Britain.  
According to some authors
68
, it is useful to think of the “no religion” category as one 
extreme in the religiosity scale. Thus the benefits that are typically associated with religious 
involvement are not available to the unaffiliated.  
Following these reasons, we consider the “no religion” category as the reference group in 
our quantitative analysis, being supported in our decision by the important proportion of this 
category in the total number of emigrants from our sample (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. The distribution of Romanian migrants according to religious affiliation 
  
Religion Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Orthodox 1176 77,7 77,7 
Catholic 82 5,4 83,1 
Protestant 24 1,6 84,7 
Neo-Protestant 81 5,4 90,0 
Muslim 3 0,2 90,2 
Mosaic 7 0,5 90,7 
No religious affiliation 141 9,3 100,0 
Total 1514 100,0  
Source: processed by the authors using RES data, 2010 
 
The proportion of migrants with “no religion” or atheists in our survey is surprisingly 
high in the context of Romanian revival religiosity
69
. A similar situation was identified by 
Jasoo
70
, when studying skilled migrants from US. The largest group of skilled migrants 
according to religious affiliation is the no-religion category (27.6%). 
  
Control variables. Socio-demographic predictors used as control variables include age (AGE), 
gender (GENDER), number of minor children living in receiving country (CHILD) and the last 
level of education attended (EDU). Education is a scale variable ranging from 1 to 7 and coded 
as follows: 1- primary school, 2- vocational school, 3-secondary education (high school), 4- 
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second level of secondary education, 5-first level of tertiary education, 5- higher education, 6-
master degree, 7-doctoral studies.  
The level of integration in the labour market from receiving country is evaluated through 
the number of years spent in migration country (TIME). For the same purpose, we have also 
considered the education received by the emigrant in host country (EDU1), described in our 
models as dummy and coded with 1 if the emigrant have followed courses in the country of 
emigration and 0 otherwise. Additionally, the intention of returning to Romania (RETURN) was 
included in our econometric approach as a binary variable coded 1 if the emigrant has the 
intention to return and 0 otherwise. 
Before moving onto multivariate analysis, it is useful to investigate whether economic 
outcomes are significantly different across religious groups. In this respect, descriptive statistics 
are presented in Table 2. The average income is 5.77, corresponding to an average monthly level 
of 2385 USD. Compared to this, the persons with “no religion” or atheist have the highest 
income, while the lowest income is obtained by Neo-Protestants and orthodox migrants. The 
change in income was positive for all religious groups, with the highest level in the case of “no 
religion” and the lowest in the case of Neo Protestants.  
The highest percentage of remitting migrants is affiliated to Neo Protestants Churches, 
followed by those belonging to Orthodox Church. It seems surprising that the migrants with the 
highest income, those with no religious affiliation, have the lowest probability to remit. 
 
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics for the effect and control variables 
 
Variables Number of 
observations Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
AGE 1514 17 76 35.81 9.937 
GENDER 1514 0 1 0.63 0.482 
CHILD 677 1 5 2.01 0.843 
EDU 1514 1 8 5.07 1.795 
EDU1 1514 0 1 0.54 0.499 
TIME 1514 1 61 7.42 6.611 
RETURN 1514 0 1 0.33 0.471 
INCOME 1514 1 11 5.77 3.110 
INCOME_INDEX 1514 0.09 11.00 1.47 0.961 
REMIT 1514 0 1 0.54 0.498 
Source: processed by the authors using RES data, 2010 
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Given the wide distribution among these outcome variables and variables of interest (see 
standard deviations in Table 2), there is sufficient variation for further testing the association 
between economic outcomes and religion. 
 
5. Results and comments 
 
The first model considers migrants‟ monthly income as being the effect variable. The model 
is statistically significant and explains in a good proportion the variability of income across 
migrants (R
2
=0.24). The dummies explaining religious affiliation are statistically significant for 
Orthodox and Catholic migrants. 
 
Table 3. OLS regression coefficients for models 1 and 2 
 
 
MODEL 1 
Effect variable: income 
MODEL 2 
Effect variable: income change 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Unstandardized Coefficients 
B Std. Error B Std. Error 
 (Constant) 0.478  0.399  1.251
*** 
0.138 
AGE 0.025
*** 
 0.008  -0.002 0.003 
GENDER 1.463***  0.146  0.019 0.051 
EDU 0.551***  0.040  0.014
* 
0.014 
EDU1 0.851***  0.144  0.203*** 0.050 
TIME 0.082***  0.013  0.023
*** 
0.004 
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION( “no religion”- reference group) 
  Orthodox -0.417
* 
 0.236  -0.073 0.082 
Catholic -0.708*  0.373  -0.060 0.130 
Protestant -0.699  0.600  -0.412
* 
0.208 
Neo-protestant -0.320  0.376  -0.009 0.130 
N 1514 1514 
R
2 0.248 0.113 
Durbin-Watson 
test 
1.989 
2.015 
Significance: ***p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.10 
Source: processed by the authors using RES data, 2010 
 
The emigrants‟ belonging to all religious groups are exhibiting lower outcomes in terms 
of income, compared to migrants with “no religion”. All regression coefficients for religion 
affiliation variables are negative. Therefore, the persons which are not religiously affiliated are 
better off compared to religious persons. The influence of religion on income is statistically 
significant in the case of Orthodox and Catholic migrants, while for the Protestants and Neo-
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Protestants the level of significance is lower. The results of the regression model 1 presented in 
table 3 show that Neo-protestants, followed by Orthodox, have the highest religious influence on 
income, while the Catholics have the lowest influence of religion on income, compared to 
migrants who are not religiously affiliated. 
All control variables are statistically significant in the first regression model, gender 
having the highest impact; income is 1.4 times higher in men‟s case, compared to female. 
The outcome variable in the second model is the change in income. In this respect, we 
have computed the income index by comparing the migrant‟s income in the moment of filling 
the questionnaire with the income received at the first job in the destination country. The income 
index is explained by religion to a lower extend, compared to the variable income in the previous 
regression, the model being statistically significant. At the same time, all regression coefficients 
are negative and therefore the variation in income is lower for each religious group compared to 
“no religion” group of migrants. We conclude that persons with no religious affiliation have 
better results in terms of income change compared all other religious groups. If we compare 
these groups, we notice that Protestants have the lowest economic effect, while Neo-protestants 
have the highest economic effect, meaning the lowest penalty in respect with the persons not 
religiously affiliated.   
The results from the quantitative analysis are reflecting the existence of a significant gap 
in terms of economic outcomes of Romanian migrants between those affiliated to a religion and 
those unaffiliated. More than that, there are important differences in economic effects between 
religious groups. It is important to notice that religious minorities in the sending country- 
Romania- such as the Neo-Protestants have the lowest penalty in receiving country. As it was 
emphasized by Sandu
71
, religious minorities in Romania are better organized and benefit from a 
better network compared to the Orthodox Church. Our findings support the idea that Romanian 
emigrants “import” the religious networks in their receiving country, using it to increase and 
improve their economic status, in the context of a lower education compared to other religious 
groups. 
Following the objectives of our research, the next question we consider is if Romanian 
emigrants with different religious affiliations differ in their remitting behavior, compared to the 
“no religion” group. 
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While the literature on the determinants of remittances is well documented and there are 
several studies on religiosity and social behaviors, there is little empirical evidence on the 
relationship between religious affiliation and remittances sending propensity. Based on the 
assumption that religion provides a motivation for helping others and immigrants remit for 
altruistic motives, we expect religiously affiliated immigrants to be more likely to remit.  
 
Table 4. Logistic regression coefficients for model 3 
 
MODEL 3 B S.E. Exp(B) 
Effect  variable: remitting decision 
AGE 0.019
* 
0.010 1.019 
GENDER -0.228 0.186 0.796 
CHILD -0.215** 0.100 0.806 
TIME -0.037
** 
0.013 0.963 
EDU -0.209
*** 
0.053 0.812 
INCOME 0.157
*** 
0.032 1.170 
RETURN 0.791
*** 
0.185 2.205 
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION  
( “no religion”- reference group) 
   
Orthodox 0.344 0.302 1.410 
Catholic 0.247 0.450 1.280 
Protestant 1.536
* 
0.920 4.648 
Neo-Protestant 0.542 0.426 1.720 
Constant -0.158 0.569 0.854 
No. of observations 1514 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.114 
Cox & Snell R Square 0.09 
Hosmer-Lemshow-test 0.397 
Significance: ***p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.10  
Source: processed by the authors using RES data, 2010 
  
We employ logistic regression in order to answer this research question. The variable of 
interest - religious affiliation- is maintained the same as in the previous two cases, while the 
control variables have been reconsidered. We introduce new control variables -described in 
section 4.2.-consistent with the existing literature on remittances
72
 in order to better support our 
objectives. With the exception of gender, all the control variables are significant with standard 
significance level (see Table 4). 
Our results from the logistic regression analysis indicate at the first glance that 
immigrants with different religious affiliations do differ in their remitting behavior. All religious 
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groups have higher probabilities to remit compared to the “no religion” group. Protestants have 
the probability to remit four times higher compared to the “no religion” group, while Neo-
protestants have a 1.7 times higher probability. For the Orthodox the value is 1.4, while for 
Catholics is 1.2, as the odd ratios presented in Table 4 are indicating. 
This is in line with our expectations and it is a strong argument in supporting the 
hypothesis that emigrants belonging to a religious group are more likely to remit. The model is 
statistically significant and has a good level of explanation of the probability to remit, though 
“Protestant” is the only statistically significant interest variable.  
 
6. Conclusions and directions for further research 
 
A significant part of the rich literature on migration has addressed the impact of religion 
on the international migration, such as the socio-economic and religious inclusion of the 
immigrants in the host country. We consider the empirical dimension of this topic, making use of 
various statistical methods to test the assumption that religious belief is reflecting upon the 
behavior and economic performance of Romanian migrants.  
This paper contributes to the literature by providing a quantitative analysis of the 
economic outcomes of immigrants and religion. Therefore, we provide insightful addition to the 
traditional analysis of migration and remittances by including religion, in a regression 
framework, as one of explaining factors that allow for understanding the economic success of 
Romanian international migrants. More specifically, the paper examines whether the socio-
demographic variables and immigrant‟s religious affiliation are important determinants of 
income, income change and remittance behavior. We analyze emigrants from the sending 
country perspective- Romania- and in this sense we propose a new approach compared to the 
present literature which is based on data coming from receiving countries. We exploit a new data 
source on migration, the Romanian Emigrants Study (RES) database resulted after an online 
survey, developed during the research project The Effects of Labor Force Migration and 
Demographical Structural Changes on Dynamic Economies.  
In order to obtain a more comprehensive picture of the impact of the religious faiths on 
the economic performance in a migration context, we have developed three regression models. 
The results allow us to conclude that membership to any religion group is negatively affecting 
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income, which is decreasing with different intensities, compared to the “no religion” group. 
Furthermore, persons with no religious affiliation have the better results in terms of income 
change, compared to all other religious groups. Comparisons across these groups indicate that 
Protestants have the lower effect, while Neo-protestants have the highest effect, meaning the 
lowest penalty in respect with the no religiously affiliated persons. 
The results stemming from the logistic regression indicate that immigrants from different 
religious affiliations do differ in their remitting behavior. All religious groups have higher 
probabilities to remit compared to the “no religion” group. Protestants have the probability to 
remit four times higher compared to the “no religion” group, while Neo-protestants have a 
probability to remit 1.7 times higher. In the case of Orthodox migrants the value is 1.4 and for 
Catholics is 1.2.  
To conclude, through this paper we identified significant differences in economic 
outcomes of Romanian emigrants, according to their religious affiliation. One important finding 
is that in the case of persons with no religion or atheists, the economic outcome is higher, 
compared to those that are members of religious communities, but their probability to remit is 
lower. The higher level of education achieved by this “no religious” group compared to all other 
religious migrants might be one explanation of the results; this is one path to be followed in our 
further research on this topic.  
Our work opens the door for other future research opportunities in this field. One 
promising line of research would be to extend the analysis by including more religion variables 
in the regression equation in order to discriminate between different channels through which 
religion impacts Romanian migrants‟ behavior and economic success. From a methodological 
point of view, we intend to refine the analysis from a regional perspective, using the territorial 
data available in our database by means of spatial regression methods. This will allow us to 
account for the regional distribution of Romanian immigrant communities, some of which were 
established on religious grounds, as religion frequently acts as a pull factor for international 
migration of Romanian religious minorities. 
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